突发事件冲击下的或有支付机制与创投融资决策
投稿时间:2019-11-12  修订日期:2019-11-12  点此下载全文
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作者单位E-mail
赵林梦 贵州大学数学与统计学院 qaz5373@163.com 
基金项目:国家自然科学(71361003);贵州省自然科学([2018]3002)
中文摘要:运用实物期权理论探讨或有支付机制如何实现创业融资决策。假定创业企业利润流服从跳跃-扩散过程,考察具有突发事件冲击时基于或有支付机制的最优融资决策问题。应用或有权益分析方法,给出了如何最优的设计不同类型的或有支付机制,使创业企业家和风险投资家愿意同时并共同支持给定的创业企业及其增长战略。研究发现,创业企业家和风险投资家的最佳投资时机不受或有支付类型的影响,但随着突发事件的平均到达率或利润流的跳跃幅度的增加,创业企业家做出投资决策的利润触发值降低。
中文关键词:创业融资,实物期权,或有支付,突发事件,跳跃-扩散过程
 
Contingent Payment Mechanism and Venture Capital Financing DecisionUnder the Impact of Unexpected Sudden Events
Abstract:In this paper, the real option theory is used to discuss how Contingent Payment Mechanisms can realize Venture Capital financing decisions. Assuming that the profit flow of a Entrepreneurial Firm follows a jump-diffusion process, the optimal financing decision based on Contingent Payment Mechanisms with the impact of unexpected sudden events is investigated. Applying the contingent-claim approach, we show how to optimally design different types of contingent payment mechanisms so that Entrepreneurs and Venture Capitalists are simultaneously and jointly willing to support a given Entrepreneurial Firm and its growth strategy. We find that optimum investment timing is unchanged regardless of the features of the underlying Contingent Payment Mechanism, but with the increase of the average arrival rate of sudden events or the jump size of profit flow, the profit trigger value for Entrepreneurs to make investment decisions decreases.
keywords:Entrepreneurial  Finance, Real  Option, Contingent  Payment, Sudden  Events, Jump –Diffusion  Process
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