消费者偏好下的两在位制造商阻止策略选择研究
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引用本文:谭雅心,刘名武.消费者偏好下的两在位制造商阻止策略选择研究[J].经济数学,2020,(4):73-83
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作者单位
谭雅心,刘名武 (重庆交通大学 经济与管理学院重庆 400074) 
中文摘要:讨论生产高质量产品和生产低质量产品的两个在位制造商阻止生产中等质量产品的潜在制造商进入市场策略,考虑消费者产品质量偏好,分别建立了两个在位制造商采取不改变定价策略、采取联合定价阻止策略以及采取联合产量阻止策略模型,分析不同阻止策略对产品价格、在位制造商利润和潜在制造商进入成本的影响.数值分析结果研究表明,当进入成本高于某个阈值时,在位制造商不用采取任何阻止策略潜在制造商都不会进入市场.当进入成本适中时,相比其他两种阻止策略,两个在位制造商采取联合产量阻止策略会使潜在制造商的最低进入成本最大,这种策略下生产高质量产品的在位制造商利润最大,而生产低质量产品的在位制造商的利润最小.
中文关键词:在位制造商  市场进入  阻止策略
 
Deterrence Strategies Selection of Two Incumbent Manufacturers with Consumers Preferences
Abstract:This paper discusses the strategies to prevent a potential manufacturer producing the medium-quality products from entering into the market by two incumbent manufacturers producing the high-quality products and the low-quality products respectively. The no-change pricing strategy, the joint pricing prevention strategy and the joint output prevention strategy are adopted respectively by the two incumbent manufacturers considering consumers' quality preferences. And the impacts on product price, incumbent manufacturer's profit and potential manufacturer's entry cost under different preventive strategies are analyzed. The numerical results show that, when the entry cost is higher than a certain threshold, the potential manufacturer will not enter the market without taking any preventive strategies. When the entry cost is moderate, compared with the other two entry deterrence strategies, the joint output prevention strategy by two incumbent manufacturers will maximize the minimum entry cost of potential manufacturer. Under this strategy, the profit of the incumbent manufacturer producing the high-quality products is the largest, while that of the incumbent manufacturer producing low-quality products is the smallest.
keywords:incumbent manufacturers  market entrance  deterrence strategy
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