基于网上拍卖的共同价值托投标分析
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引用本文:陈绍刚,王 楠.基于网上拍卖的共同价值托投标分析[J].经济数学,2020,(3):175-182
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陈绍刚,王 楠 (电子科技大学 数学科学学院,四川 成都 611731) 
中文摘要:基于信息不对称条件下的共同价值模型,刻画了网上拍卖过程中可能存在的托投标行为,并运用博弈理论结合竞价关系求解了竞标者的赢标概率和最优竞价策略.研究发现,在共同价值模型下,参与竞标的人数与嬴者诅咒的发生存在联系;在最高出价者赢标的概率模型基础上,分别建立了是否存在托投标行为时的竞标者收益模型,并求解了竞标者的均衡竞价策略.
中文关键词:信息不对称  共同价值拍卖  赢者诅咒  托投标
 
Research on Online Auction of the Shill Bidding with Common Values
Abstract:Based on the common value model under the condition of asymmetric information, the possible behaviors of shill bidding in online auction are described, and the winning probability and the optimal bidding strategy of bidders are solved by using game theory and bidding relationship. Under the common value model, there is a relationship between the number of bidders and the occurrence of the winner curse. Furthermore, based on the probability model of the highest bidder winning the bid, the profit models of the bidder with or without the shill bidding behavior are established respectively, and the equilibrium bidding strategy of the bidder is solved.
keywords:asymmetric information  common value model  winner curse  shill bidding
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