基于三方博弈的共享汽车演化模型及策略分析
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引用本文:陈华鑫,贾文生.基于三方博弈的共享汽车演化模型及策略分析[J].经济数学,2020,(2):88-95
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作者单位
陈华鑫,贾文生 (贵州大学 数学与统计学院贵州 贵阳 550025) 
中文摘要:考虑共享汽车品质和共享汽车服务等因素,分别从政府、企业和出行者3个角度研究共享汽车出行策略选择,构建三方动态演化博弈模型,并对模型的策略选择及其演化路径进行分析.研究表明:当形象效用提升、管理成本降低、对私家车出行惩罚增大时,政府倾向于“监督”策略;当高端汽车的运营收益增加、低端汽车由于质量问题造成的损失增加、政府对低端汽车企业的惩罚增大时,企业倾向于提供“高端汽车”策略;当高端共享汽车出行与私家车出行收益之差增大、高端共享汽车出行与低端共享汽车出行收益之差增大、政府对共享汽车出行补贴增加时,出行者倾向于“共享汽车”策略.
中文关键词:产业经济学  共享汽车  演化博弈  高端汽车
 
Research on the Evolution Model of Shared Car Based on Tripartite Game
Abstract:Based on the evolutionary game theory, considering the factors of shared car quality and shared car service, this paper studies the travel strategy choice of shared car from the perspectives of government, enterprise and traveler, constructs the three-party dynamic evolutionary game model, and analyzes the strategy choice behavior and evolution path of the model. The research shows that: when the image utility is improved, the management cost is reduced, and the penalty for private car travel is increased, the government tends to "supervise" the strategy; When the operating income of high-end automobile increases, the loss of low-end automobile due to quality problems increases, and the government's punishment for low-end automobile enterprises increases, enterprises tend to provide "high-end automobile" strategy;When the difference between high-end sharing car travel and private car travel increases, the difference between high-end sharing car travel and low-end sharing car travel increases, and the government's subsidy for sharing car travel increases, travelers tend to "share car" strategy.
keywords:industrial economics  shared car  game theory  advanced car
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