基于复合式团队两阶段道德风险模型的担保企业评委激励机制
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引用本文:李铁宁,李 曦,胡 宁.基于复合式团队两阶段道德风险模型的担保企业评委激励机制[J].经济数学,2020,(1):63-69
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李铁宁,李 曦,胡 宁 (长沙理工大学 经济与管理学院 湖南 长沙 410004) 
中文摘要:学术界将团队道德风险与两阶段道德风险模型结合构建复合式模型成为激励理论新研究的趋势.然而,这种复合式模型对团队成员间协作,业务两阶段间努力的影响以及代理人的行为因素考虑不足.以担保企业的评委团队在评议会和评审会两阶段的道德风险为研究对象,运用经济学激励理论和最优理论与算法,构造了团队两阶段道德风险复合模型,并通过数值仿真揭示了评委团队在不同规模人数下,团队成员的业务两阶段的努力影响因子,评委团队协作度、两阶段评委道德敏感度与激励强度的关系.主要研究结果表明:在业务评议会阶段,评委团队为3~5人规模,且两阶段努力影响因子偏小或评委道德敏感度偏大时,对该阶段评委团队应施加高激励;而当评委间的协作度为中等或高水平时,随着评委间协作度的增加,对该阶段评委团队的激励强度应递减.在业务评审会阶段,随着评委人数的增加且评委两阶段的努力影响因子减小,对该阶段评委团队应施以较强的正激励;随着评委道德敏感度的减小或评委的协作度增加,对该阶段评委应强化正激励.
中文关键词:担保企业  团队两阶段道德风险  激励机制
 
Incentive Mechanism of Guarantee Enterprise Judges Based on the Compounded Team’s Two-Stage Moral Hazard Model
Abstract:The combination of team moral risk and two-stage moral hazard model has become a new trend of incentive theory research in academia. However, this compound model takes insufficient consideration to the impact of team members' collaboration, business two-stage effort, and agents' behavior. This paper takes the guarantee enterprise Judges team members' moral risk in council and Judges two-phase as the research object, and constructs the compound model of team two-stage moral hazard by using the economic incentive theory and the optimal theory and algorithm. Through numerical simulation, this paper reveals influence factors' relation between incentive intensity and team members' business efforts impact factor of two-stages, the Judges' team collaboration degree and Judges' moral sensitivity of two-stage in the condition of the different Judges' team sizes. The main research conclusions are as fallows: in the stage of the business council, when the Judge team is 3~5 people and the influence factor of the two-stage is too small or the Judges' moral sensitivity is too high, the Judge team should be highly motivated. However, when the Judge’s collaboration degree is medium or high, the incentive intensity of the Judging team at this stage should decrease with the increase of the degree of cooperation among the Judges. In the stage of business Judges, the Judges' team should be strongly positive encouraged with the increase of the number of Judges and the reduction of the influence factor of the Judges' efforts in the two stages. Additionally, positive incentives should be strengthened for Judges at this stage when the Judges' moral sensitivity decreases or the Judge's collaboration degree increases.
keywords:guarantor enterprise  teams' two-stage moral hazard  incentive mechanism
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