| 资金约束制造商二级供应链混合融资订购决策 |
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| 引用本文：束 依 睿.资金约束制造商二级供应链混合融资订购决策[J].经济数学,2019,(4):53-59 |
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| 中文摘要:考虑了包含一个资金约束的制造商和一个零售商的两级供应链，当制造商生产资金受到约束时，可采用两种不同的混合融资方式：①股权融资与银行信贷；②股权融资与零售商提前支付.制造商先通过向外部投资者出售部分股权，进而获得部分融资，剩余部分可以采用银行信贷或零售商提前支付的方式来解决.分别对两种不同的混合融资方式进行研究，得到供应链双方的最优决策与融资均衡.研究表明，零售商提前支付与股权融资更具有优势，可为零售商与制造商以及整个供应链创造更多的融资价值，此外，在两种混合融资渠道下，资金约束制造商存在最优资本结构. |
| 中文关键词:供应链管理 融资均衡 博弈论 混合融资 |
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| Hybrid Financing Order Decisions in a Two-echelon Supply Chain with a Capital Constrained Manufacturer |
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| Abstract:This paper considers a two-echelon supply chain with one capital-constrained manufacturer and one retailer. When the manufacturer’s production capital is constrained，the manufacturer can adopt two different hybrid financing channels: ① equity financing and bank credit；② equity financing and the retailer’s advance payment. The manufacturer first derives part of financing by selling part of his equity to outside investors, and the rest can be resorted to the bank credit or the retailer’s advance payment. The players’ optimal decisions and financing equilibrium under two different hybrid financing channels are derived. The research shows that equity financing and retailer’s advance payment is more beneficial and creates more values for the retailer，manufacturer and the whole supply chain. In addition，there exists an optimal capital structure for the capital constrained manufacturer in each hybrid financing channel. |
| keywords:supply chain management financing equilibrium game theory hybrid financing |
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