“双积分”制度下新能源汽车双合作制造的博弈分析
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引用本文:于晓辉1,刘玉博1,邹正兴2,陈 雯3.“双积分”制度下新能源汽车双合作制造的博弈分析[J].经济数学,2019,(4):46-52
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于晓辉1,刘玉博1,邹正兴2,陈 雯3 (1.北京物资学院 物流学院北京 1011492.北京理工大学 管理与经济学院北京 1000813.中国石油销售公司,北京 100007) 
中文摘要:基于即将实施的“双积分”政策,分析普通、新能源汽车生产线共存的供应链合作模式,建立“双积分”下新能源汽车双合作制造模型,提出车企总收益最大化的生产布局策略.分析分配应该满足的性质,将满足此性质的双合作博弈Shapley值应用到两条生产线并存的供应链合作制造问题中,提出最优分配策略.最后,以吉利汽车为例进行实证分析,对于总积分值为正的单位,应该通过增加普通汽车产量、对外出售积分、提高积分达标值等增加收益.实证显示新能源汽车双合作制造模型的有效性,模拟结果可为车企决策提供参考.
中文关键词:双积分  新能源汽车  双合作博弈
 
New Energy Vehicle Co-production Analysis under Double Integration System Based on Game Theory
Abstract:The double integration policy is analyzed. Through the analysis of the cooperation model in supply chain between the common automobile and the new energy automobile, the dual cooperation model between the car enterprises and its suppliers is established. The production adjustment strategies are proposed to improve the total income. The properties that reasonable allocation strategies should satisfy are proposed and analyzed. Profit distribution strategy of manufacturing cooperation is given based on bi-cooperative game’s Shapley value. Finally, an empirical analysis of Greely Auto Group is made.The results show that manufacturing cooperation, whose total scores are positive, should increase the output of common automobiles, sell scores and improve fuel integral standard to increase the value of each partner's income distribution. The empirical results show the validity of our model, and can be seen as a decision-making for car enterprises.
keywords:double integration  new energy vehicle  bi-cooperative game
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