外卖食品安全问题的演化博弈分析
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引用本文:惠 芸,杨 辉,杨光惠.外卖食品安全问题的演化博弈分析[J].经济数学,2019,(4):41-45
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作者单位
惠 芸,杨 辉,杨光惠 (贵州大学 数学与统计学院,贵州 贵阳 550025) 
中文摘要:运用演化博弈论的方法对外卖商家之间,订餐平台监管部门和外卖商家之间相互作用时策略选择行为进行分析.结果表明:当外卖商家生产不合格的外卖收益大于生产合格外卖的收益、订餐平台监督部门对生产不合格外卖的商家处罚力度过轻或对外卖合格性的检测成本过高时,不合格外卖生产必然发生.要确保外卖商家生产合格外卖,就必须对生产不合格外卖的商家进行严惩,降低生产不合格外卖的预期收益.同时,要加强订餐平台建设,降低监管成本,保证监管部门严格执法.
中文关键词:外卖  食品安全  复制动力学  演化博弈  演化稳定策略
 
Evolutionary Game Analysis on the Safety of Takeaway
Abstract:This paper uses the evolutionary game theory to analyze the strategic choice behavior of the interaction between the takeaway merchants, the supervision department of the ordering platform and the takeaway merchants. The results show that, when the profit of unqualified takeaway is greater than that of qualified takeaway, and the punishment imposed by the supervision department of the ordering platform is too light or the detection cost of unqualified takeaway is too high, the unqualified takeaway production will inevitably occur. To ensure that takeaway merchants produce qualified takeaway, it is necessary to severely punish the merchants who produce unqualified takeaway and reduce the expected earnings of unqualified takeaway. At the same time, we should strengthen the construction of ordering platform, reduce the cost of supervision, and ensure that the supervision departments strictly enforce the law.
keywords:takeaway  food safety  replicator dynamics  evolutionary game  evolutionarily stable strategy
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