消费者预防在线销售掺假行为的博弈模型及最优策略
    点此下载全文
引用本文:刘文丽,万 中.消费者预防在线销售掺假行为的博弈模型及最优策略[J].经济数学,2018,(2):19-24
摘要点击次数: 701
全文下载次数: 0
作者单位
刘文丽,万 中 (中南大学 数学与统计学院 湖南 长沙 410083) 
中文摘要:建立了描述消费者与带掺假行为的在线零售商之间相互博弈的双层规划模型, 其中消费者为领导者, 在线零售商为随从者. 消费者预防在线销售掺假行为的两种策略是进行商品品质检查和采用延期付款, 在线零售商则依据消费者的预防策略决定是否销售掺假商品.根据消费者和在线零售商的可能采用的策略, 对模型分四种情形展开分析与讨论, 并分别在不同情形下得到了消费者与在线零售商的最优决策. 结果表明, 消费者延期付款的最优时间和进行商品品质检查能有效遏制在线零售商掺假行为.
中文关键词:博弈论  在线销售策略  双层规划模型  掺假
 
Game Model and Optimal Strategies of Preventing Adulteration Between Consumer and Online Retailer
Abstract:A bi-level programming model is constructed to describe the game between consumers and online retailers with adulteration preference, where the consumer is the leader and the online retailer is the follower. The consumer can use two strategies for preventing adulteration of retailors by checking quality of goods and delay of payment. The model is analyzed in four cases by taking into consideration whether the consumer conducts inspection on goods and the online retailer sells products with adulteration or not. Optimal strategies are obtained in the four cases, respectively. The results show that the optimal strategies of consumers for inspection and delay of payment can efficiently prevent adulteration preference of the online retailer.
keywords:game theory  strategy of online sales  bi-level programming model  adulteration
查看全文   查看/发表评论   下载pdf阅读器