典型模式下网络平台与食品生产经营者的相关决策
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引用本文:费 威.典型模式下网络平台与食品生产经营者的相关决策[J].经济数学,2018,(2):13-18
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作者单位
费 威 (东北财经大学 经济学院辽宁 大连 116025) 
中文摘要:针对网络食品安全问题,分别构建网络平台与食品生产经营者合作一体化与各自独立时的经济利益优化模型,比较他们食品安全的相关决策,并在网络平台与食品生产经营者各自独立模式下对两者的行为策略进行博弈分析.结果表明:相比于各自独立,在合作一体化模式下网络平台设定的食品质量安全标准更低,食品生产经营者的食品供给量更大;在各自独立模式下,平台预期利润受食品安全问题负面影响更显著;网络平台与食品生产经营者合作一体化时,质量安全标准对两者合作的预期总利润影响相对较小.在各自独立模式下,若食品生产经营者供给不安全食品的“机会收益”不高于“机会损失”,供给安全食品与严格监管是食品生产经营者与网络平台的最优策略组合.
中文关键词:数量经济学  决策分析  博弈模型  网络食品安全
 
Analysis on the Decision between the Network Platform and the Food Production Operators under Typical Mode
Abstract:For the network food safety problem, the optimization models of the economic interest under the cooperated integration and the independence of the network platform and the food production operator are built, their food safety decisions are compared, and the behavior strategy of the network platform and the food production operator in the independent mode is analyzed by the game theory. The results show that compared to their respective independence, the food quality and safety standards set by the network platform are lower, and the food quantity supplied by the food production operators is greater in the mode of the cooperated integration; the expected profit of the platform is affected by the food safety issues more significantly negatively in their respective independent mode; when the network platform is integrated with the food production operators, the quality and safety standards have relatively little influence on the expected gross profit. In their respective independent mode, if the ‘opportunity income’ is not higher than the ‘opportunity loss’ under the condition of the food production operator supplying unsafe food, the supply safe food and strict supervision is the optimal strategy combination of the food production operator and the network platform.
keywords:quantitative economics  decision analysis  game model  the network food safety
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