指数函数需求下供应链公平偏好信息动态演进研究
    点此下载全文
引用本文:覃燕红1,徐丹丹1,陈戈2.指数函数需求下供应链公平偏好信息动态演进研究[J].经济数学,2017,(2):1-9
摘要点击次数: 631
全文下载次数: 0
作者单位
覃燕红1,徐丹丹1,陈戈2 (1.重庆理工大学 管理学院 重庆4000542.重庆大学 经济与工商管理学院 重庆400030) 
中文摘要:在指数函数需求下对零售商公平偏好信息动态演进进行了研究,并与线性需求条件下的研究结论进行了对比分析。研究发现:两种需求条件下可得到相同的结论,如批发价格和零售价格对公平偏好的敏感性分析,批发价格契约不能协调供应链,但却能缓减“双重边际效应”等.同时还发现:两种需求条件下可得到不同的结论,如当零售商为公平偏好类型且信息非对称时,零售商效用、供应链效用在指数函数下随自身公平偏好强度递增而在线性需求函数下随自身公平偏好强度递减等.需求函数的形式会影响供应链中的利润分配,在指数函数需求条件下,零售商利润肯定不比供应商少且只要零售商向供应商传递公平偏好信号,那么零售商就一定能够超过供应商利润,且超过部分随公平偏好度递增.
中文关键词:管理心理学  公平偏好  博弈论  信息非对称
 
Dynamic Evolution of Supply Chain Fairness Information under Exponential Demand
Abstract:The dynamic evolution of fair preference information was studied under the demand of exponential function,and the conclusions under the linear demand and nonlinear demand were compared.We prove that there some same conclusions in term of the sensitivity analysis of the wholesale price and the retail price on the fairness concern,and furthermore,the wholesale price contract can’t coordinate the supply chain,but can alleviate the "double marginal effect" in both condition.At the same time,we find some different conclusions in each demand function such as when the retailer cares about fairness and the fairness information is asymmetric,the retailer utility,supply chain utility are increasing with fairness in exponential demand function but decreasing with it in linear demand function.So the form of demand function can affect the distribution of profits in the supply chain,and the retailer profit is always equal to or more than the supplier once the retailer transfer the fairness signal to supplier.
keywords:management psychology  fairness concern  Game theory  information asymmetry
查看全文   查看/发表评论   下载pdf阅读器