“讨价还价”的“纳什解”的形成路径与结论拓展
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引用本文:陶为群.“讨价还价”的“纳什解”的形成路径与结论拓展[J].经济数学,2016,(2):62-67
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作者单位
陶为群 (中国人民银行南京分行南京 210004) 
中文摘要:建立了一个“讨价还价”的双边适应性预期模型,并利用这个模型的二元常系数线性差分方程组,揭示“纳什讨价还价解”的形成路径.对于不是“纳什讨价还价解”的一般讨价还价的成交结果,同样可以运用这样一个模型来揭示.基于这个模型,当买、卖双方希望成交,各方的出价通过逐次调整会最终收敛到同一个常数,因此能够从理论上保证讨价还价最终成交.双方当中有一方不肯让价而成交的情形,可以作为这个模型退化成为单边适应性预期模型的情形.举例计算说明了一个讨价还价问题的收敛过程与结果.
中文关键词:理论经济学  讨价还价  合作博弈  适应性预期  收敛
 
The Formation Path of “Nash Solution” of Bargain and the Development of Its Conclusion
Abstract:A bilateral adaptive expectation model of “bargain” was set up, a binary constant coefficients liner difference equation system of the model was used, and a formation path of “Nash Bargaining Solution” was explicated. This model can also be used to explicate a common conclusion of bargain that is not “Nash Bargaining Solution.” Based on this model, bids of both buyer and seller all converge to same constant if they wish to clinch a deal, so that the “bargain” can clinch a deal ensured in theoretical meaning. A situation can be as the degeneration of the model that both clinch a deal although one of them keeps own bid from beginning to end, because it becomes a single adaptive expectation model. An example was drawn upon to verify the process and result of a common bargain problem.
keywords:theoretic economics  bargain  cooperation game  adaptive expectation  convergence
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