| 具有质量安全惩罚主导权零售商与供应商的食品安全检测决策 |
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| 引用本文：费威.具有质量安全惩罚主导权零售商与供应商的食品安全检测决策[J].经济数学,2016,(1):93-99 |
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| 中文摘要:针对食品质量安全检测问题，建立了一个供应商与一个具有质量安全惩罚主导权零售商关于质量安全检测水平的优化模型，分析了他们各自独立与合作一体化模式下的质量安全检测水平决策，重点探讨了零售商对供应商的质量安全惩罚额对双方检测水平决策的影响.结果表明：当零售商对供应商的惩罚额较高时，供应商与零售商的质量安全检测水平都会随着惩罚额的增加而提高等主要结论.最后，为加强我国食品质量安全检测提供了对策. |
| 中文关键词:食品安全 检测水平 质量安全惩罚 决策分析 |
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| Analysis on the Retailer with the Dominant Right of the Quality Safety Penalty and Supplier’s Decisions of Food Safety Inspection |
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| Abstract:The optimal model on the food quality safety inspection level of a retailer with the dominant right of the quality safety penalty and a supplier was built to analyze the decisions of the quality and safety inspection level in the modes of independent dispersion and cooperative integration for the test of food safety and quality. And the influence of the retailer’s quality safety penalty amount for the supplier on the inspection level was discussed. The main conclusion shows that,when the quality safety penalty amount from the supplier to the retailer is relative higher, the quality safety inspection level of the supplier and the retailer would increase by the penalty amount. Finally, the countermeasures were provided in order to strengthen the food quality safety inspection in China. |
| keywords:food safety inspection level quality safety penalty decision analysis |
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