异质Stackelberg寡头竞争下创新产品技术许可策略研究

王静; 包振华

异质Stackelberg寡头竞争下创新产品技术许可策略研究

引用本文：王静，包振华.异质Stackelberg寡头竞争下创新产品技术许可策略研究[J].经济数学,2015,(3):21-25

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作者	单位
王静，包振华	（辽宁师范大学数学学院，辽宁大连116029）

中文摘要:基于异质产品Stackelberg寡头竞争模型, 建立了拥有新产品创新技术在位厂商与潜在竞争对手间的技术许可博弈模型. 模型中假设潜在竞争对手可以接受许可，也可通过自我研发创新技术进入市场参与竞争. 根据潜在竞争对手研发成本的高低，研究了创新厂商的最优两部制收费策略.研究结果表明：潜在竞争者总会接受创新技术许可，最优许可策略依赖于研发成本、市场参数以及产品的替代系数.

中文关键词:Stackelberg寡头模型两部制收费异质产品研发成本

Study on Licensing Strategies of New Product Innovation in a Differentiated Stackelberg Duopoly

Abstract:Based on a differentiated Stackelberg duopoly, this paper established a licensing game model in which an incumbent innovator competing with a potential rival can develop the technology for the new product, or accept the licensing to enter the market. Depending on the two scenarios for the development cost, the optimal two-part tariff licensing strategies for the innovator were investigated. It concludes that the technology is always licensed and the optimal licensing contract depends on the development cost incurred by the rival, the market parameter and the substitution coefficient.

keywords:Stackelberg duopoly two-part tariff product differentiation development cost

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