分布式能源中互惠主义在机会主义环境下的存活
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引用本文:龚谊承1,2, 杨雨燕1,牛晓梦1.分布式能源中互惠主义在机会主义环境下的存活[J].经济数学,2015,(3):7-12
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龚谊承1,2, 杨雨燕1,牛晓梦1 (1.武汉科技大学武汉4300652.武汉科技大学 冶金工业过程系统科学湖北省重点实验室湖北 武汉430065) 
中文摘要:随着经济的快速发展,分布式能源成为重点发展的对象.供应商也在慢慢地增多,为了优化分布式能源供应市场的结构,有必要对分布式能源供应商的合作与竞争展开理论研究.按照行为主体在合作中的主观偏好不同,将分布式能源供应商划分为互惠主义者和机会主义者两类.并据此展开了4个方面的研究.首先,在静态博弈的框架下,构建了两种类型供应商在合作和背叛两种可选策略下的模型;然后,应用演化博弈的知识来分析机会主义行为的演化,依据复制动态方程得到了供应市场的演化均衡状态;接着,分析惩罚条件下机会主义行为的演化,从而找到消除机会主义行为的惩罚力度的范围,有利于促进市场良好状态的形成;最后,通过给予假设参数符合条件的具体数值,来模拟出时间与分布式能源机会主义供应商占总供应商比例的关系,更直观地展示了的理论分析结果,便于政策制定者参考.
中文关键词:能源经济学  分布式能源  演化博弈  机会主义  互惠主义
 
The Survival of Reciprocial Distributed-energy Enterprises in the Environment of Competition and Cooperation with Some Opportunists
Abstract:According to some preferences, distributed energy suppliers were classified into two types: suppliers with reciprocity and opportunism. Based on the classification, four aspects of jobs were done. First, a static game model of the two types of suppliers was bulit with two strategies of cooperation and betrayal. Second, the evolution of opportunistic behavior and the evolution of the supply market equilibrium were analyzed by using the knowledge of the evolutionary game theory and replicator dynamic equations. Third, under the condition of punishment, the evolution of opportunistic behavior was analyzed ,which benefits to find the range of penalties that can help eliminate opportunistic behavior and then promote the formation of the market in good condition. Moreover, by giving the parameters some concrete numbers, a numerical example was simulated to visualize the relationship between the time and the proportion of opportunistic distributed energy supplier to total supplier, which can provide the reference for the decision makers.
keywords:Energy Economy  Distributed energy  Evolutionary game  Opportunist  Reciprocitarian.
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