上下游企业静动态博弈的反倾销税率模型
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引用本文:唐智波,钟根元.上下游企业静动态博弈的反倾销税率模型[J].经济数学,2014,(4):52-58
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作者单位
唐智波,钟根元 (上海交通大学 安泰经济与管理学院上海 200052) 
中文摘要:反倾销是世界贸易组织(WTO)框架下为国内进口竞争性产业提供保护的一种合法措施,如何制定最优的反倾销税率越来越受到国内企业和政府的重视.文章根据我国某些垄断行业的真实情况,基于上下游均为垄断企业的市场结构,假定国内外上下游企业都追求利润最大化,并假定最终产品市场的国内外下游企业处于斯塔克伯格竞争,而中间产品市场的国内外上游企业处于古诺竞争,运用博弈论的逆向归纳法建立了国内政府基于国内社会福利最大化的对国外进口中间产品和最终产品同时征税的反倾销税率模型,并分析了反倾销税率的影响因素.文章结论对于我国相关企业及政府应对倾销与反倾销问题具有较大的参考价值.
中文关键词:上下游  古诺竞争  斯塔克伯格竞争  反倾销税率
 
Optimal Anti-dumping Duty Rate Based on Upstream and Downstream Industry under Static and Dynamic Game
Abstract:Anti-dumping (AD) has gradually become the main measure to protect the domestic industry permitted by WTO. The determination of optimal AD duty rate has been paid special attention by domestic firms and governments. Based on market structure of upstream and downstream industry, this paper established the optimal models of AD duty rate by means of backward induction in game theory, which are used to impose import surtax on the intermediate and final goods, on the conditions that the foreign and domestic upstream and downstream firms pursue the profit maximization, and the domestic government pursues the maximization of domestic social welfare, and the foreign and domestic downstream firms involve Stackelberg competition and the foreign and domestic upstream firms involve Cournot competition. Meanwhile, this paper examined the factors which affect AD duty rate used by the domestic government. The conclusion made in this paper provides reference to dealing with dumping and AD issues faced by domestic firms and government.
keywords:upstream and downstream  Cournot competition  Stackelberg competition  anti-dumping duty rate
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