零售商占优下的两部定价合同与通道费
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引用本文:刘树人,唐 沛,刘新静.零售商占优下的两部定价合同与通道费[J].经济数学,2014,(3):66-71
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作者单位
刘树人,唐 沛,刘新静 (湘潭大学 数学与计算科学学院湖南 湘潭 411105) 
中文摘要:本文考虑由单个占优的零售商和单个供应商组成的二级供应链模型.在价格相依的随机需求下,研究分散系统下的批发价格合同与两部定价合同.在一定的条件下得到两种合同中供应链成员的最优决策和利润以及供应链系统的利润.分析表明,当零售商占优时两部定价合同比批发价格合同更有效.这在一定程度上说明当前零售业中收取通道费的合理性.
中文关键词:供应链管理  零售商占优  两部定价合同  通道费
 
Two Part Tariffs Contract and Slotting Allowances under A Dominant Retailer
Abstract:We investigated a two-echelon supply chain with a dominant retailer and a supplier. Under stochastic price-dependent demand, we studied the wholesale price and two part tariffs contracts in the decentralized systems model. Under some relatively mild conditions, we respectively obtained the optimal decisions and profits on the supply chain members, and the supply chain system’s profits. We show that two part tariffs contract performs better than the wholesale price contract when the retailer is dominant. We give a reasonable explanation for the use of slotting allowance in the retail industry.
keywords:supply chain management  dominant retailer  two part tariffs contract  slotting allowances
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