FDI企业选址与东道国环境规制博弈
    点此下载全文
引用本文:杨仕辉,翁蔚哲.FDI企业选址与东道国环境规制博弈[J].经济数学,2013,(2):92-99
摘要点击次数: 900
全文下载次数: 164
作者单位
杨仕辉,翁蔚哲 (暨南大学 经济学院广东 广州510632) 
中文摘要:建立了高进入壁垒和低进入壁垒下双寡头博弈模型,应用逆向求解法,得到了引资国环境政策是否改变和FDI流出国企业是否迁址的临界条件.结果表明:在高进入壁垒的产业中,由于东道国较高的进入壁垒,外国企业可能不迁址;但如果考虑FDI产生的正外部性且溢出效应较高,引资国可能降低环境规制水平以吸引FDI企业进入,但从环境的角度考虑,此时全球环境损害更大.在低进入壁垒产业中,东道国政府选择提高环境规制水平是其占优策略,对引资国和全球都是帕累托改善的.
中文关键词:FDI  企业选址  环境规制  进入壁垒
 
The Game of Corporate Relocation and Environmental Regulation under Foreign Direct Investment
Abstract:A duopoly game model under high and low entry barriers was established. Using the way of backward induction, the critical condition of host country's environmental regulation and the relocation choice of outflow country's corporation was obtained. The results show that, in the context of high entry barriers, the corporation may choose not to relocate. Considering the positive externalities of FDI and the higher spillover effects, host country may reduce the level of environmental regulations in order to attract FDI enterprises to enter. However, the global environmental damage is greater in terms of the environment. In low entry barriers industries, the host government's choice of raising the level of environmental regulation is its dominant strategy, which is a Pareto improvement for the host country and the world.
keywords:FDI  corporate relocation  environmental regulation  entry barriers
查看全文   查看/发表评论   下载pdf阅读器