总部薪酬激励与内部资本市场配置效率

张学伟1; 2; 陈良华1

总部薪酬激励与内部资本市场配置效率

引用本文：张学伟1，2 ,陈良华1.总部薪酬激励与内部资本市场配置效率[J].经济数学,2012,(3):7-11

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作者	单位
张学伟1，2 ,陈良华1	(1东南大学经济管理学院,江苏南京 211189； 2常熟理工学院管理学院，江苏苏州 215500)

中文摘要:在内部资本市场代理理论的框架下，以非线性规划的库恩-塔克定理为主要工具，探讨了总部薪酬激励机制在内部资本市场配置中的关键影响.假定股权收益和私人投资收益是总部薪酬的主体，分部间的投资额取决于总部对股权收益和私人投资收益的权衡，这种权衡导致了内部资本市场的“平均主义”.更进一步，投资总量内生时，追求股权收益和私人投资收益最大化，总部倾向于在各分部过度投资.

中文关键词:内部资本市场薪酬激励平均主义寻租活动

Compensation Incentive of CEO and Internal Capital Market Allocation Efficiency

Abstract:In the agency theory of internal capital market, the effect of the compensation incentive of headquarters on the efficiency of internal capital market was discussed by using KKT. Assuming that equity incentive and investment incentive are headquarters’ compensation body, investments in divisions will be decided by the comparison between equity incentive and investment incentive，and the comparison results in internal capital market will lead to “Socialism”. Moreover, for the maximum of equity incentive and investment incentive, headquarters prefer to overinvestment in divisions.

keywords:internal capital market compensation incentive socialism rent seeking

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