财政腐败的宏观经济分析:一个理论框架
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引用本文:张林永1,严丽君2.财政腐败的宏观经济分析:一个理论框架[J].经济数学,2011,(2):89-94
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作者单位
张林永1,严丽君2 (1. 广州市南沙区万顷沙镇财政所广东 广州5114622. 广州市番禺区国家税务局广东 广州511400) 
中文摘要:建立了一个考虑税收腐败和公共支出腐败的经济增长模型,从理论上探讨财政腐败行为及其影响.主要结论归纳:第一, 财政腐败降低私人资本的回报率,使厂商的生产力下降,就整体而言阻碍了经济增长.第二,最优税率可能大于或小于Barro的最优税率,取决于征税效率和寻租引发的行政成本.第三,两种类型的公共支出隐含着不同程度的腐败机会,以及对官员行为产生的不同“激励”作用,从而扭曲公共支出结构效率.第四,增强制度约束力对遏制财政腐败至关重要.
中文关键词:财政腐败  税收腐败  公共支出腐败  经济增长
 
The Macroeconomic Analysis of Fiscal Corruption:A Theoretical Frame
Abstract:This paper constructed a growth model containing tax corruption and public expenditure corruption to analyze the behavior and effect of fiscal corruption. Main conclusions are as fallows. First, fiscal corruption reduces the rate of private capital return, which decreases the productivity of manufacturers and hinders economic growth in the whole. Second, the optimal tax rate can be less or higher than Barro’s optimal tax rate, which depends on the predation efficiency of tax collection efficiency and administrative costs caused by rent seeking. Third, Two types of public expenditure imply different degree of corruption opportunities and different “incentive” effect on behavior of officials. Finally, enhancing regulations’ binding force is the key problem to prevent fiscal corruption.
keywords:fiscal corruption  tax corruption  public expenditure corruption  economic growth
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