| 不对称信息下技术员工股票期权管理激励的博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文：陈同扬,李宝山,陈庭强.不对称信息下技术员工股票期权管理激励的博弈分析[J].经济数学,2010,27(3):53-58 |
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| 中文摘要:分析了技术员工偷懒 “囚徒困境”的形成过程，构建了技术员工股票期权管理激励的博弈模型，进行ESS博弈均衡分析，得出了防范技术员工偷懒行为的惩罚力度与股票期权管理激励因子之间的关系，在此基础上得出结论：股票期权与偷懒惩罚力度相结合，能有效预防技术员工偷懒行为 |
| 中文关键词:不对称信息 技术员工 股票期权 ESS 博弈模型 |
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| Game Analysis of Technical Staff Stock Option Management Incentives under Asymmetric Information |
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| Abstract:This paper analyzed the formation process of “prisoner's dilemma” of the technical staff's idleness, constructed the games models of stock option management excitation for ESS game equilibrium analysis, and obtained the relationship between stock option management excitation and the punishment for preventing the technical staff's idleness. From the analysis, the conclusion can be made that the combination of stock options and punishment can effectively prevent technical staff's idleness. |
| keywords:asymmetric information technical staff stock options ESS game model |
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