基于解聘补偿的股权激励模型研究
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引用本文:刘新民,温新刚,丁黎黎.基于解聘补偿的股权激励模型研究[J].经济数学,2010,27(3):9-15
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作者单位
刘新民 (1山东科技大学 经济管理学院,山东 青岛266510
2西安交通大学 管理学院陕西 西安710049) 
温新刚  
丁黎黎  
中文摘要:传统的委托代理模型存在激励的短期性与道德风险的单边性两方面的问题.通过引入解聘补偿机制,建立并分析了信息完全对称和不完全对称两种情况下的股权激励模型,研究了委托人解聘倾向对股权激励合同设计的影响机制.研究结果表明:在初始合同中引入解聘补偿,不仅可以有效缓解委托人的道德风险,而且可以进一步提升代理人的工作努力程度.
中文关键词:解聘补偿  解聘倾向  股权激励  委托代理模型
 
Study on Stock Option Incentive Models Based on Dismissal Compensation
Abstract:The traditional principal agent model has two disadvantages with one being the short term incentive, and the other the unilateralism of the moral hazard. This paper established a stock option incentive model based on the dismissal compensation, studied the optimal design of the incentive contract under symmetrical and asymmetrical information conditions, and analyzed the effect of the dismissal tendency on the design of the incentive contract. The findings suggest that the introduction of the dismissal compensation into the initial contract not only relieves the principal’s moral hazard, but also further improves the agent’s working efforts.
keywords:dismissal compensation  dismissal tendency  stock option incentive  principal agent model
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